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A COMMENT ON CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON’S 
“POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND FINLAND” 
Malick W. Ghachem∗ 
Christopher Johnson has dug deeply into a neglected corner of comparative 
law and emerged with some fascinating and important contrasts.  Finland does not 
appear often on the radar screen of American legal scholars, even those whose 
primary focus is comparative law.  And so we are indebted to Johnson for 
reminding us that critical comparative insights can arise out of studying the 
experiences of nations deemed “marginal” to the international system, and to 
mainstream comparative law scholarship (which itself occupies a position of 
uncertain import in American legal scholarship generally).  Johnson’s findings are 
all the more significant because they come from one who, as the Chief Appellate 
Defender for the state of New Hampshire, bridges the gap between the legal 
academy and the practice of law, and who is deeply versed in the workings of 
American appellate criminal procedure.   
In this brief comment, I want to try to amplify the import of Johnson’s article 
by removing it slightly from its Finnish-American axis of origin.  This approach 
stems from the very originality of Johnson’s work, for I dare say that few 
comparative law scholars are conversant in the niceties of Finnish criminal law, 
and I am no exception.  Whether Johnson’s portrait of appellate criminal practice in 
Finland diverges from the understanding of others who have studied this topic is 
not a matter I am qualified to judge.  This comment is nonetheless written in the 
faith that comparative law scholars are not destined to be forever working the 
isolated vineyards of their respective sub-fields.  There is a larger conversation in 
process to which we can all contribute. If I will raise some questions about the 
nature of Johnson’s project, it is primarily to underscore that what he has said about 
Finland speaks powerfully to this larger work-in-progress that is American 
comparative law.  By its very nature, that work is collaborative: it depends on the 
contributions of many individual scholars, and it stands to gain both from those 
who deepen our existing knowledge of “mainstream” comparison and from 
scholars, like Johnson, who veer off the beaten path in search of the overlooked 
contrast or similarity.1  
What, then, has Johnson found on that less-traveled path?  He has persuasively 
demonstrated that the American way of doing criminal appeals is not a natural or 
necessary result of having a criminal justice system, even one as complicated and 
overburdened as the American version.  In Finland, appellate courts seek by and 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. 
 1. Finland’s criminal justice system is not the only marker of comparison that has drawn the 
attention of American political and social commentators recently.  See Diane Ravitch, Schools We Can 
Envy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/ 
08/schools-we-can-envy/. 
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large to ensure the substantive correctness of a criminal verdict.  To this end, they 
permit a degree of de novo fact-finding on appeal that is unimaginable by current 
American standards.  In effect, the appellant defendant has a second bite at the 
apple, a chance to introduce evidence not introduced below, and also to reargue the 
significance of testimony already heard – all in the name of persuading the 
appellate tribunal that justice was not done below.  The corollary of this practice is 
that it also permits the prosecution to seek review of acquittals – a leeway given to 
the American prosecutor in only a very narrow class of cases, about which more 
below.  
Johnson is careful not to overstate his comparison.  He notes that, in practice, 
the Finnish system of de novo review of facts on appeal may involve a certain 
amount of deference to the trial court’s conclusions.2  (Those conclusions, Johnson 
explains, must be placed in writing and thus legitimated on rational grounds, in 
contrast to the American jury verdict, which typically requires only that the jury 
affirm or negate the guilt of the accused and, on occasion, verify that certain 
predicates of a conviction have been established).  He also reminds us that, on the 
American side, the 6th amendment right to trial by jury does not preclude appellate 
courts from reviewing factual findings, and that federal habeas courts are 
authorized to engage in limited fact-finding on federal law claims – most notably, 
where evidence purporting to demonstrate actual innocence is newly discovered – 
even if they rarely choose to exercise that power.3 
Moreover, the idea that American appellate courts focus on procedure rather 
than substance can itself be overplayed, as Johnson nicely underscores by 
characterizing the three prototypical appellate challenges of an American criminal 
defendant as proxy attacks on the substance of the conviction.  Those three 
challenges – to the admission or exclusion of evidence at trial, the adequacy of 
defense counsel’s representation, and the prosecution’s pretrial compliance with the 
Brady obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence – do indeed serve as covert tests 
of substantive and not merely procedural justice.4  In each case, however, the 
standard for showing actual “prejudice” to the defendant is so high as to make all 
but the most egregious of these facially procedural violations at trial immune to 
appellate scrutiny. 
This is perhaps particularly the case in the context of the law of prosecutorial 
misconduct, which remains resolutely hostile to a defendant’s challenges on appeal 
notwithstanding some truly striking examples of Brady and other violations in 
recent years.5  In most cases, of course, a prosecutor’s pretrial failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence is only discovered after a conviction has been secured: that is 
the very nature of the violation at issue.  By that time, the American rule requiring 
the defendant to show that a procedural violation actually prejudiced the result at 
trial serves as an effective bar to all claims of prosecutorial misconduct.  An 
appellate court can scold the prosecutor for a non-prejudicial Brady violation, but if 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Christopher M. Johnson, Post-Trial Judicial Review of Criminal Convictions: A Comparative 
Study of the United States and Finland, 64 ME. L. REV. 426, 435 (2012).  
 3. Id. at 435-36, 450. 
 4. Id. at 463. 
 5. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Moves to Void Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/us/politics/02stevens.html?fta=y. 
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the evidence of guilt is otherwise deemed adequate, a lecture is all that the 
prosecutor will receive, barring a secondary system of sanctions not tied to the 
outcome of the trial.  Here, however, we must note an important limitation in 
Johnson’s framework, which views American appellate practice through the lens of 
the Anglo-American tradition of trial by lay jury.  In the case of prosecutorial 
misconduct, it is not simply the jury’s discretion that the American system protects: 
it is also the prosecutor’s.6  And that distinction may, in turn, suggest other ways in 
which the Finnish-American contrast depends on differences not only in the 
identity of the fact-finder, but on the powers and identities of the prosecuting 
officials in each system. 
That said, Johnson’s emphasis on the critical role of the jury in American 
criminal practice is surely correct.  The clear implication of the “law on the books,” 
at least, is that American appellate courts avoid de novo fact-finding on appeal first 
and foremost because of the sanctity of the jury in the Anglo-American tradition.  
The Finnish system, by contrast, does not seem to regard lay participation in the 
trial as sufficiently significant to insulate fact-finding from the interference of 
appellate judgment.7  This contrast can have a somewhat tautological character to 
it, since by Johnson’s account the Finnish system (in all but misdemeanor cases) 
involves a tribunal consisting of one professional judge and three lay judges rather 
than a thoroughgoing lay “jury.”  Moreover, American appellate courts justify their 
tradition of deference to the jury in functional and not simply categorical terms: 
juries are better equipped, our appellate judges tell us, to judge such intangibles as 
the credibility of witnesses.8  Finally, the issue of whether the American hostility to 
de novo appellate review stems from the jury tradition per se, as opposed to 
instrumental concerns about efficiency, is an open one, as Johnson acknowledges.9  
Nonetheless, Johnson’s point that history, not logic, has shaped the current makeup 
of these criminal justice systems seems absolutely right – both as an abstract 
proposition, and also as a characterization of what makes contemporary American 
criminal justice “tick.” 
What then ought we to make of this contrast as a normative matter?  Johnson 
does not push the normative implications as aggressively as he could, preferring to 
allow his comparison to tell the normative story instead (a refreshing departure 
from at least some currents in legal scholarship).  For those concerned with the 
rights of criminal defendants, the case for the Finnish approach seems 
unimpeachable.  There are simply more opportunities to challenge a conviction “on 
the merits,” more chances to get right on appeal what defense counsel might have 
somewhat mishandled or overlooked at trial, without having to worry about the 
obstacles created by the American law on ineffective assistance of counsel.  As 
Erwin Chemerinsky relates, Yale law professor Dennis Curtis exaggerated only 
slightly when he observed that, under the leading case of Strickland v. Washington, 
“an attorney will be found to be adequate so long as a mirror put in front of him or 
                                                                                                                 
        6. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007). 
 7. Johnson, supra note 2, at 472. 
 8. Id. at 472-73. 
 9. Id. at 473-74.  
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her at trial would have shown a breath.”10  Defendants in Finland do not have to 
worry about rules like the Strickland standard because the ability to reopen factual 
issues on appeal makes those rules superfluous. 
Of course, not everyone who cares about the state of American criminal justice 
has a special concern for the rights of criminal defendants.  That is as it should be: 
victims ought to have influential and vocal advocates, as should the interests of law 
enforcement and public safety.  But an increasing number of commentators, from 
all points on the political spectrum, are concluding that the American way of doing 
criminal law is relatively (and in some ways needlessly) harsh when it comes to 
criminal suspects and offenders.11  To these observers, the Finnish preference for 
flexibility in criminal appeals might seem like an obvious antidote.  But as 
Johnson’s account reminds us, in criminal justice the phenomenon of discretion can 
cut both for and against the interests of defendants.  The very flexibility that makes 
Finland’s appellate procedure seem more favorable to defendants also gives 
prosecutors authority they do not have in the American system.  In Finland, the 
prosecution can appeal acquittals.  Under federal law, American prosecutors may 
do so only where an acquittal results from the allowance of a defendant’s motion to 
set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence (a so-called “Rule 29 motion”).12  
In all other circumstances, an acquittal – whether by the jury or on a pre-verdict 
Rule 29 motion – will normally put an immediate and absolute end to the 
prosecution’s case.   
It would be interesting to have an empirical sense of how often prosecutors 
appeal convictions in Finland, and how often they are successful in doing so.  
Whatever the actual numbers may be, this revealing difference between American 
and Finnish appellate procedure ought to give us at least some pause before 
concluding that either system is clearly more favorable to defendants than the 
other.  My very first case as a practicing lawyer was a federal tax fraud prosecution 
that ended on a (successful) pre-verdict Rule 29 motion.  I still remember the 
powerful feeling of finality that accompanied the trial judge’s announcement of his 
decision: for all of the government’s power to investigate and prosecute crime, 
there was simply nothing more to be done by either side.  The parties shook hands, 
and the two defendants thanked their legal teams before walking out of the 
courthouse as free men, never again to be burdened by the imposing weight of the 
justice system.  Finality in criminal adjudication is a two-way street. 
Of course, most criminal cases do not end on successful Rule 29 motions, and 
we have come very far indeed from the day when American juries regularly 
acquitted criminal defendants, as they seem to have done in the Gilded Age that 
William Stuntz describes so powerfully in his recent book The Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice.13  Looking back at that era from our present-day 
vantage point, it is difficult to deny that Johnson’s overall comparison captures a 
very large part of the world of American criminal justice.  And yet, certain aspects 
                                                                                                                 
 10. 466 U.S. 668 (1984); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 144 (2010). 
 11. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); JAMES 
Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE (2005); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE (1999). 
 12. FED.R. CRIM. P. 29. 
 13. STUNTZ, supra note 11, at 30. 
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of the twentieth-century evolution of American criminal law make me wonder if 
there is not more to be said about that comparison.  Three such aspects are worth 
noting. 
First: the significance of procedure in American criminal justice.  Johnson 
notes that the Finnish trial system is less procedurally dense than the American 
system.14  But the proceduralization of American criminal law is the product of a 
relatively quite recent chapter of American constitutional history – the Warren 
Court criminal procedure “revolution” of the 1950s and 1960s – not the “deep 
history” that Johnson describes in Part Two of his article.15  Are we dealing, in 
other words, with a larger and more general contrast between a Finnish preference 
for litigation on the merits and an American penchant for procedural thickness, a 
contrast that is essentially independent of the nature of direct appellate or habeas 
corpus review per se?16 
Second: the disposability of American appellate review.  For all of our cultural 
fascination with the criminal trial, criminal appeals, and the Supreme Court, one 
wonders whether most Americans are aware that there is nothing in the Federal 
Constitution that prevents a state from abolishing all criminal appellate process 
altogether.  So said the Supreme Court in 1894, and so has it affirmed on multiple 
occasions since then.17  What would Johnson make of this American option to do 
away with the appeal altogether?  Would Finland’s criminal justice system tolerate 
this drastic scenario?  Is this the ultimate contrast in the American and Finnish 
appellate cultures, the contrast that would swallow all of the other (finer) 
distinctions that Johnson so painstakingly draws?  What is the good of a system as 
plentifully endowed with procedural protections, as ours is, that can be short-
circuited in this way?  The question may seem hypothetical in the extreme, but as 
Stuntz has shown so persuasively, we err in assuming that our current ways of 
criminal (and appellate) litigation are set in stone, destined to remain unchanged 
forever.   
Third: the relatively complex and developed nature of the law of evidence in 
the United States.  Johnson notes that Finland adheres to a system of free judicial 
evaluation of the evidence.  The American law of evidence, by contrast, is highly 
convoluted, full of loopholes and exceptions, counter-intuitive rules that appeal to 
intuition only to end up subverting it: in short, a mystery even to some of our most 
skilled jurists, even after it was codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence during 
the 1960s and 1970s.  That difference, incidentally, is related in important ways to 
the story of judicial torture in continental Europe.  As John Langbein has 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Johnson, supra note 2, at 452-54. 
 15. On the Warren Court procedure revolution, see, STUNTZ, supra note 11, at 216-43.  This part of 
Stuntz’s book has met with some strongly felt criticisms.  See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Our “Broken 
System” of Criminal Justice, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/ 
articles/archives/2011/nov/10/our-broken-system-criminal-justice/. 
 16. Of course, even this contrast between “substance” and “procedure” must be qualified.  Is the 
prosecution’s Brady obligation to produce exculpatory evidence a matter of factual innocence/guilt or a 
procedural function?  Johnson notes that substance and procedure are intertwined in the Fourth 
Amendment context.  Johnson, supra note 2, at 462 & n.276.  The point holds equally for non-Fourth 
Amendment rules like Brady. 
 17. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 
(2005). 
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explained, judicial torture went away in seventeenth-century Europe when the 
Roman-canon law of proof began no longer to require either a confession or the 
testimony of two witnesses.18  The inquisitorial system that emerged in torture’s 
aftermath was a system of free evaluation of the evidence: free at the trial stage, 
which makes very little use of the exclusion of evidence, and (eventually, with the 
modern development of formal appellate institutions and procedures) free at the 
appellate stage as well.19  By contrast, the Anglo-American tradition, which largely 
escaped the use of judicial torture in the medieval and early modern periods, has a 
much more constricted notion of what constitutes legitimate evidence at trial.  
American criminal trials, when they are not averted by plea bargains, are largely 
contests over the application of the rules of evidence.  And the American system 
has a correspondingly narrow understanding of what evidentiary matters can be 
raised on appeal.  This, too, is a difference in legal culture that transcends appellate 
review per se. 
Where the law of evidence and the American criminal trial intersect, of course, 
one evidentiary rule occupies pride of place: the exclusionary rule, that 
quintessential product of the twentieth-century constitutionalization of criminal law 
in the United States.  Johnson concludes his article by suggesting that our deference 
to jury fact-finding on appellate review reflects a compromise with the goal of 
accuracy.20  That seems correct.  But isn’t such compromise also the nature of 
American rules that have nothing to do with appellate procedure per se, most 
notably the exclusionary rule?  If so, then it is worth asking (again) to what extent 
the bold contrast that Johnson draws is inherent in the American way of thinking 
about the appellate process specifically, as opposed to criminal justice as a whole. 
These are, however, relatively minor questions and critiques of a superlative 
study that deserves the attention of a broad audience of comparative lawyers and 
students of criminal justice.  Johnson has done what the best comparative law does: 
hold up a mirror to ourselves so that we can see aspects of our present-day legal 
culture in a more focused and revealing light.  His concluding suggestion that the 
American emphasis on efficiency and public confidence in post-conviction review 
is inseparable from our over-investment in mass or hyper-incarceration is alone 
worth the price of admission and suggests an important line of research that might 
profitably be undertaken.  Do such key markers of American post-conviction 
review as the prevalence of waiver doctrine or the generally deferential standard of 
review correlate not simply with our commitment to the Anglo-American tradition 
of trial by jury, but also with the dramatic growth in the American prison 
population beginning in the 1970s and then exploding in the 1990s and 2000s?  
Johnson has posed this and many other provocative and important questions.  For 
asking these questions, and for sharing a fascinating and overlooked story of 
comparative law along the way, we are all greatly in Professor Johnson’s debt.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 18. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN 
RÉGIME 4, 45 (1977). 
 19. Johnson, supra note 2, at 454. 
 20. Id. at 473. 
